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Abstract
In general the process of implementation of Islamic banking in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan appears to be proceeding with rela-
tive success. However, number of problems have surfaced during the tran-
sition period, among which is a tendency for short-term assets to dominate
commercial bank portfolios. The negative effects on capital formation is
one result of this portfolio behavior. The cause of this behavior is a
set of regulations constraining profit-sharing activities of commercial
banks. It is shown here that such regulations rather than reducing the
risks of bankruptcies in the banking system may well increase them.
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Summary
An economic objective of Islamic banking is to have the rate of
return from real activities become the allocative mechanism in the finan-
cial sector. To achieve this objective, Islamic law proposes a configura-
tion of various modes of transactions as a replacement for interest-based
activities. Among these are methods referred to as "strongly" Islamic
because they are based on risk and profit-sharing arrangements. Where
profit-sharing modes cannot be employed, other methods are proposed
which, in appearance, resemble interest-based modes of transaction, hence,
they are referred to as "weakly" Islamic. Among the latter are modes
employed in short-term trade transactions.
The process of implementation of Islamic banking in the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran and Pakistan is proceeding with relative success. In the
transition period, however, a number of problems have emerged among which
is a tendency for short-term (weakly Islamic) assets to dominate commercial
bank portfolios. The negative effects on capital formation is one result
of this behavior. Among the causes of this portfolio behavior is a set
of regulations constraining profit-sharing activities of commercial banks.
It is shown, in this paper, that such regulations do not necessarily
reduce risks of bankruptcies but may well increase such risks.

I. Introduction
The Islamic Prohibition against charging of interest can be inter-
preted as a situation in which there are no risk-free assets in the port-
folio of investors. 1/ Islamic law proposes a configuration of various
modes of transactions to replace an interest-based financial system.
Among these are principal modes which can be referred to as "strongly"
Islamic because they are based on risk and profit sharing relationships
between the owner of financial resources and the entrepreneur. Two of
these modes are called "musharakah" and "mudarabah." 2/ In transactions
where risk and profit sharing methods cannot be employed, such as pur-
chases of consumer durables, other modes of financing are proposed that
in appearance resemble financial transactions in an interest-based
system, hence, they can be referred to as "weakly" Islamic.
In an ideal Islamic system the rate of return from the activities in
the real sector becomes the allocative mechanism in the financial sector.
Recent theoretical studies have shown that such a system can be implemented
without any a priori demonstrable negative effects on the saving-investment
process, 3/ or on financial intermediation and monetary policy. 4/ The
validity of these assertions has, to a large degree, been borne out by
the recent experiences of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan which
have adopted an Islamic financial system. 5/
The fact that optimal portfolios can be constructed in the absence
of risk-free assets has been frequently demonstrated in the portfolio
theory literature at least since the late 1950s. 6/ In its simplest form
the problem can be stated as follows: for N risky assets, choose the pro-
portion fi of the portfolio invested in the ith asset such that the port-
folio risk is minimized. The search is for an efficient portfolio defined
as the locus of all feasible portfolios that have the smallest variance
for a prescribed expected return. The solution to the problem assumes
that the investor is risk averse; meaning that (a) if two portfolios have
the same standard deviation and different expected returns, the one with
the larger expected return is preferred, (b) if two portfolios have the
same expected returns but different standard deviation, the one with the
smaller standard deviation is preferred, and (c) if two portfolios have
different standard deviation and expected returns, the one with larger
expected return and lower standard deviation is preferred. Graphically,
1/ Haque and Mirakhor (1986b).
2 / See Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987) for definition of the various modes.
3/ Haque and Mirakhor (1986; a and b).
47 Khan (1986), and Khan and Mirakhor (1987).
5/ Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987).
6/ See, for example, Martin (1955), Markowitz (1959), and Mossin
(1966).
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this implies that so long as expected return is desired and variance is
not, every indifference curve in the expected return-standard deviation
space will be upward sloping. Once the efficient frontier is obtained,
the optimal portfolio can be determined and is represented by the point
of tangency between the efficiency frontier and an indifference curve as
shown in Figure 1. The point C would represent an optimal portfolio,
with risk equal to a* and return equal to TT*.
The above problem has been solved by a number of authors 1/ and
successfully extended to derive the efficient frontier and comparative
static properties of optimal portfolio behavior of depository financial
intermediaries in the absence of risk-free assets. 2/ Clearly then at a
theoretical level an Islamic financial system does not create difficulties
for formation of optimal and well-diversified portfolios, either for
individual investors or the banks. However, the experiences of Iran and
Pakistan, thus far, indicate that the implementation of Islamic banking
may involve certain problems. A majority of these problems relate to a
lack of legal and institutional framework that would allow closer bank-
client partnership on the basis of risk and profit sharing thus accom-
modating the objectives of the Islamization process• One such problem is
an observed tendency on the part of banks to concentrate their asset
portfolios in short-term and relatively low-risk assets acquired through
weakly Islamic modes of finance such as mark-up and installment sales.
Many of the factors which have been instrumental in encouraging
short-term asset concentration are symptomatic of the state of transition
from an interest-based system to Islamic banking. 3/ One factor, which is
policy induced, is a set of regulations imposed on the portfolio behavior
of banks in the two countries intended to limit the exposure of banks'
portfolios to relatively high-risk, high-return assets which the banks
can obtain through musharakah and mudarabah financing. 4/
The authorities, while agreeing that Islamic banking system must
operate on the basis of risk-return sharing arrangements in which the
relationship between a bank and its client is one of partnership rather
than creditor-debtor, argue that the structure which must be maintained
is one which "does not lead to the collapse of the banking system." 5/
1/ See for example Martin (1955), Sharpe (1970), Fama (1971), Fama
and Miller (1972), Merton (1972), and Black (1972). (a standard solution
is given in the Appendix)
2/ See for example Hart and Jaffee (1974).
3/ See Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987), p. 24.
4/ See the Appendix in Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987) for some of these
regulations.
5/ For a strong and clear statement of Pakistan authorities' concern
with the risk of bank failures as a result of exposure to risk and profit
sharing activities, see Kazi (1984).
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The concern with the safety of the banking system is essentially based on
a type of moral hazard argument that, in the absence of operating Islamic
values in the economy, 1/ engaging in high-risk, high-return activities by
the banks may lead to bank failures. 2] This legitimate concern of the
authorities stems, in part, from a perception that the removal of interest
rate increases risk in the financial system in general and in the banking
system in particular. One way to reduce the probability of bank failure,
according to the authorities, is to reduce this probability and enhance
bank safety by limiting mudarabah and musharakah financing. The regula-
tors' encouragement, plus the relative ease of low-risk methods of financ-
ing, has led to an overwhelming dominance of short-term assets, acquired
through trade financing, in the asset portfolio of the banking system in
the two countries. 3/
Persistence of short-term asset concentration is worrisome on at
least two grounds. First, because institutional structures are not
developed to facilitate the growth of investment-type lending (in parti-
cular the private capital markets in the two countries do not have the
required depth and breadth to accommodate the instruments necessary for
long-term investment) the banks are the only source of funds for long-
gestating projects. The second reason for concern is that, even without
existing regulation to encourage minimal exposure to longer-term risk-
return sharing financing, a tendency naturally exists among the bankers
to opt for short-term trade financing. The result of bias against
musharakah and mudarabah threatens investment-type financing and thus
capital accumulation. 4/
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the implementation
of portfolio regulation via restrictions placed on high-risk, high-return
asset acquisition through musharakah and mudarabah financing may produce
results not intended by authorities, i.e., there is a distinct possibility
that the risk of bank failure may in fact increase.
II. Bank Portfolio and Probability of Failure
It is because financial markets are imperfect that the financial
intermediaries have a role to play. 5/ Intermediaries, through
exploitation of these imperfections, alter the relationship between
1/ Qureshi (1984), p. 89, and Kazi (1984), p. 10.
2/ Kazi (1984), p. 13.
3/ Short-term assets constitute about 85 percent of financial transac-
tions, in form of mark-up, in Pakistan. In Iran, this figure was about
60 percent in the first year of the operation of the banking system
(1984-85).
4/ Ahmed, et. al. (1983) and Ahmed (1984).
5/ Stigler (1967).
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lenders and borrowers. Thus, intermediaries provide higher returns to
lenders and lower costs to borrowers than would be possible with direct
finance. In the process of intermediation a bank becomes unsafe if it
cannot liquidate enough assets to supply deposit withdrawals. If a bank
suffers severe losses so that the value of its asset portfolio declines
below the level of its debts to depositors, i.e., it has a negative cap-
ital position, then under massive withdrawals it may fail. In this con-
text bank earnings are important because a profitable operation is the
bank's first line defense against occasional shrinkage in asset value and
because profitable banks have higher capacity to attract deposits and can
better raise new capital when desired in order to take advantage of profit-
able opportunities. On the other hand, the greater the risk of a bank's
assets, the higher the level of capital required to avoid potential fail-
ures due to asset losses. Hence, the probability of failure is related
to the ability of a bank's capital to absorb losses.
Failure, then, can be defined as when a bank's losses exceed its
total capital. Given a bank's capital position and its asset portfolio
characteristics, defined by its expected return and its variance, an upper
boundary can be estimated for the probability of failure. 1/ One method
of estimation is to use Chebyshev Inequality according to which if y is a
random variable with mean m and variance a2, then
P = PR (|y - m|>d) < - ^
where d is any positive number and PR(|y - m|>d) is the probability that
y will differ from m by at least ±d. 2/
If th_e regulators_designate some disaster level r for expected net
profits IT, i.e., d = H-r, then the probability of failure will be
given as:
O2(1) P = PR[n<r] = — —
1/ This is a familiar definition of failure; see Roy (1952), Telser
(1955) Kahane (1977), Blair and Heggestad (1978), Koehn and Santomero
(1980), and Allen (1983).
2/ See Roy (1952) for proof.
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so that if r = -1, then
(2) P = PR[II<-1] 3
(H+1)
which can be graphically represented as the square of the reciprocal of
the slope of a ray in expected return-standard deviation space with an
intercept of -1 as in Figure 1. From (2) it can be seen that an increase
in the expected return decreases failure risk while an increase in variance
increases the probability of failure. The bank's portfolio thus has an
upper limit on its probability of failure which is constant along the ray
that intersects the efficient frontier at point C; where the optimal
allocation is indicated by the tangency point and where the portfolio is
characterized by proportion fi(i=1,2,...,n) of each asset and II* and
a*. The steeper the ray to the portfolio selected, the lower is the
probability of its failure for any given specification of disaster level.
III. Bank Portfolio Regulation and Failure Risk
When the regulation takes the form of restricting the role of risk
and profit sharing assets in the portfolio of banks, it has the effect of
shifting the frontier downward. The new frontier would coincide with the
old at the minimum-risk asset as in Figure 1 where the frontier in the
absence of regulation is AB and the regulated frontier is AB'. The result
is that, in the presence of regulation, not only are profits lower but the
probability of failure is higher. This is because at point D, a point
consistent with an optimal portfolio on the new frontier, the new ray
intersecting AB' at D is less steep than the old ray, i.e., there is a
higher probability of failure. Moreover, since the new optimal portfolio
selected at D is on a lower indifference curve the bank is worse off.
Additionally, the variance is larger as well. Consequently the effect of
portfolio regulation is unambiguously perverse. 1/
Moreover, by focusing their attention solely on risks of individual
assets, the regulators ignore the pooling effects of diversification. To
illustrate we assume that, in order to safeguard against the risk of bank
failure the regulators set a minimum capital to asset ratio, k. 2/ The
1/ This graphic analysis was first utilized by Blair and Heggestad
(1978) to show the perverse effects of regulations to limit the role of
high-risk, high-return assets, such as common stock, in the portfolio of
banks•
2/ See Fama (1971), and Shapiro (1982).
- 6 -
decision problem facing the bank involves selecting the optimal level of
its assets and its distribution between the available assets. It is
assumed that the bank is operating in a perfectly competitive market,
which implies that risk and return per unit of capital do not vary as a
function of bank capital thus avoiding concerns about scale effects.
For simplicity of analysis, it is assumed that there are only two
assets available, those acquired via mark-up (denoted by h) and those
obtained via mudarabah (denoted by m) financing—representing weak and
strong Islamic modes—respectively. The fractions of bank capital com-
mitted to the two assets are fh and fm. The overall and individual net
return per unit of bank capital are II, 11h, and IIm, so that:
(3) n = fhnh + fmhm
The sum of fh and fm together represent the bank's degree of leverage,
i.e., assets per unit of capital. The capital to asset ratio k constrains
the bank's degree of leverage such that: 2/
(4) fh + fm = 1/k
and (4) is assumed to be a binding constraint.
The variance of overall return II is a function of variances of
returns from each of the two assets as well as the covariance between
them. That is:
°
2 =£h °h + f2A + 2fhVhm
where a , a£, am are the variances of overall returns and variances of
the two assets respectively 2/; and ahm is the covariance between the
mark-up and mudarabah assets. 3/
1/ Ibid.
2/ Even though mark-up resembles an interest-based asset, it is still
not riskless; see Khan (1983).
3/ Markowitz (1959), Tobin (1966), Babcock (1972), Shapiro (1982) and
Allen (1983).
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Recall from (2) that the probability of bankrupcy is:
P = PR(IK-l)
Cn+ I)2
Where II, the expected overall return, is equal to fh^h +
Substitution and expansion of (2) yields an expression for the probability
of failure for this problem as:
(6) °PR(IU-l) = m ra
This expression shows the relationship between expected returns to mark-up
and mudarabah activities, the variance and covariance of returns, the
bank's capital position, and the probability of bank failure. The expres-
sion further illustrates the narrowness of focusing primarily on the risk
of mudarabah assets. It can be seen that the effect on bank's risk of
failure when the proportion fm of these assets is increased is a function
of the current level of fm as well as the variance-covariance structure
of asset returns and their means. Depending on the bank's objective
function, then, there is an optimal level of mudarabah assets for a bank.
If the bank chooses to minimize the variance of its overall returns,
then the values of fh and fm which minimize (5) can be determined.
Accordingly, the first order conditions are:
(7)
=
 2Vh 2 fm%n
(8)
mm "" m hm
From (7) and (8) we obtain:
(9)
k(
- %h
+
 a2 -
m 2a, )
hm
(10)
q h - ghm
.2 -k(a2 +h a
m
2 ahm
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It can be shown that (9) and (10) satisfy the condition that f*h + f*m = 1/k.
A sufficient condition for f*h2 to be an interior point, thus yielding a
global minimum, is that a?, cr > a, . However, since the probability
of bank failure is a function of expected return as well as its variance,
minimizing a2 could increase the risk of failure. 1/ The alternative is
to choose fh and fm such that the right-hand side of (2) is minimized.
This occurs at the point:
,,
 N ,** % (n + k) - ohm (n + k)
(11) fu = S
k [a£(n + k) + a2 (IL + k) -2a (n + IL +2k)
n m m n hm m n.
from (11) it can be seen that:
= fI if
fh* > fh if
C < fh "
and that f**h is an increasing function of o2m and Ih and a decreasing
function of a/ and II • f**h is an increasing function of a, if, and
only if,
> (n + k)ot
xt u. m n
The major implication of the above analysis is that attempts to
restrict the banks from engaging in risk-return sharing financing, such
as mudarabah, in order to reduce the variance of bank returns, could
increase the probability of failure if the expected return from mudarabah
assets exceed the expected return from mark—up, i.e., im > hh; assuming
that the variances are the same.
1/ See Shapiro (1982) p. 733.
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For regulations on portfolio composition to be effective in reducing
failure risks, their effect on overall return and its variance as well as
covariance of expected returns from various assets must be considered. A
constraint on mudarabah assets will lower the probability of failure if
the actual proportion of these assets in the bank's portfolio is greater
than its optimal value given by (11). If the expected returns from
weakly Islamic modes is different from musharakah and mudarabah then the
proportion of short-term and minimum risk assets in the portfolio will
affect its overall expected return and minimization of risk of bank
failures will lead to lower returns.
Consequently, imposing restrictions on risk-return activities of
banks simply because of their risk alone may result in nonoptimal deci-
sions. To the extent that the portfolio decisions of individual banks
are biased in favor of low-risk assets, financial intermediation in the
aggregate and, concomitantly, the allocation of real resources in the
economy is affected. The evidence available thus far indicates that
the portfolio behavior of banks in Iran and Pakistan may entail undesir-
able consequences for capital formation. It is noteworthy that in early
stages in the process of deliberations regarding the Islamization of
banking some economists foresaw the possibility that conditions may arise
which may lead to short-term asset concentration, and pointed out its
harmful effects. _1/ For example, Karsten ((1982), p. 132) argued that
the intermediation process in an Islamic banking system "could be affected
if Islamic banks were somehow constrained in carrying out the task of
transforming short-term liabilities into long-term advances." Clearly,
and at least in the case of banks in an Islamic system, in countries
where capital markets are not sufficiently deep and wide to accommodate
long-term investment financing instruments on the basis of profit sharing,
the portfolio behavior which is not optimal for the banks may also not be
optimal for the economy as a whole. 2/ Moreover, even the perception of
riskiness of raudarabah and musharakah financing by the regulators, in
isolation from their expected returns and covariances with other assets,
may represent an overestimate.
The risks which a bank takes in entering into musharakah and mudarabah
activities with a given firm can be decomposed into risks that relate to
market conditions;including socio-political conditions and general economic
fluctuations, and risks which are firm-specific. The first type of risks
will exist regardless of whether the bank engages in low-risk financing or
mudarabah and musharakah activities. The firm-specific risks can be further
1/ See, for example, Ahmed, et. al., (1983, p.12), Ahmed (1984, p.10),
Siddiqi (1983).
2/ See Pringle (1972).
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decomposed into investments and fraud risks. The former is clearly a
function of viability and profitability of the proposed project as well as
the abilities of the entrepreneur. The banks should be able to develop the
expertise necessary for project appraisal as well as monitoring the com-
petence of the entrepreneur. One way of doing so is to allow the develop-
ment of specialized banks whose main function would be investment-type
financing on the basis of profit sharing. These banks could then issue
their own liabilities to the commercial banks. It is not unrealistic,
moreover, to expect the banks, as partners, to be represented in the
managerial decision-making processes of the firm in order to monitor the
projects in which they have taken equity positions.
The risk of fraud, which is especially worrisome to the regulators, 1/
seems to have two sources. One is the possibility of underreporting of
profits earned by the firm via maintenance of two sets of books which is
in turn motivated by tax-avoidance. Although there are no precise measures
of the extent of presence of this practice, this risk can be minimized by
a system of audit stipulated in musharakah and mudarabah contracts. 2/
The other source of risk of fraud is the perception that since in risk-
return sharing arrangements the banks will have to carry the burden of
potential financial losses there is an element of moral hazard involved
in these transactions. 3/ Due to the short history of Islamic banking
practices and the minimal size of profit-sharing assets, there is no
practical way of estimating the magnitude of this risk. However, there are
at least three possible ways in which this residual risk can be minimized.
First is by implementing the Islamic law of contracts which requires that
stipulations of agreements entered into must be faithfully observed, and
which proposes well-defined retributive judicial measures to safeguard the
terms of the contract. Second is the possibility of third-party insurance
schemes with cost participation by the central bank and commercial banks.
Third is maintenance of loss-compensating reserves by the banks. 4/ It
must also be noted that hardly any bank can be expected to finance a risk-
return sharing project without sufficient information regarding the
managerial ability, competence and character of the entrepreneur.
By relaxing regulations on portfolio composition the banks will be
allowed additional opportunity to diversify their asset portfolios, thus
affecting both the overall expected net returns as well as their variance.
It has long been recognized that, depending on the degree of correlation
1/ See Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987).
2/ The contracts can stipulate bank participation in managerial decision-
making processes of the firm in order to give banks the necessary ability
to monitor firm's behavior.
3/ Haque and Mirakhor (1986,b)
4/ Siddiqi (1982 and 1983)
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between returns, portfolio risk can be reduced by diversification. 1/
It is almost a tautology that a more diversified bank represents a more
stable source of funds and a more stable institution for depositors.
IV. Conclusions
There seems to be little doubt among Muslim economists and bankers
that, given a favorable policy and institutional framework, the banks in
an Islamic system should and will undertake financing of risk-return
projects. Thus far, however, the policy stance of regulators has been to
encourage short-term and low-risk financing which has resulted in concen-
tration of bank portfolios in trade-type financing rather than long-term
investment projects. The primary cause of this policy stance has been
the perception, possibly overestimated, that the removal of the interest
rate increases the potential of moral hazard, thus making profit-sharing
investment projects risky.
This paper has shown that the overall risk of banks' portfolios and
their expected returns are what must be considered rather than the risk
of individual assets. If the regulators' concern is the failure of banks,
one way of insuring their safety without harmful effects on resource
allocation is for regulators to determine an acceptable probability of
failure and then allow the banks the freedom of determining the optimal
composition for their portfolios. Each bank can then determine the
appropriate trade-off between risk and return as well as asset diversifi-
cation in order to assess how the various modes of asset acquisition are
related in their prospects for timely payment of returns and principal.
If the banks are constrained to concentrate their portfolios heavily in
favor of one type of asset, e.g., mark-up, then that portfolio might
turn out to be very risky. In the short life of Islamic banking, a
configuration of various types of regulations have been divised which
impose guidelines—including restrictions on amounts and rate of return—
on profit-sharing asset acquisition behavior of banks for each mode of
financing which is deemed relatively risky by the regulators. Moreover,
other policy measures such as credit rationing and moral suasion are used
as controls on banks' participation in long-term profit-sharing and
investment-type financing. Given the natural propensity of the banks for
low-risk and easily administered modes of financing—which is partially
due to lack of expertise In portfolio management and project appraisal—
these regulations may hold further negative prospects for capital formation.
1/ For proof, see Lintner (1965), Samuelson (1967), Evans and Archer
(1968) and Allen(1983). Muslim economists have recognized the need for
portfolio diversification in Islamic banking; see, for example, Siddiqi
(1982) and Qureshi (1985).
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This paper has attempted to argue that the authorities' legitimate
concerns should be directed at the safety of bank's overall portfolio of
assets rather than the risk of a particular mode of financing considered
in isolation. Thus, to restrain the banking system from employing profit-
sharing modes, such as musharakah and mudarabah—methods most appropriate
for investment-type financing—simply because of perceptions of high risks
without sufficient analysis of their effects on the risk and return
characteristics of the banks' overall portfolio may neither allow Islamic
banking to take root nor permit the banking system to play an effective
role in the development process. Coupled with poorly developed equity
markets, the dynamic effects of regulations discouraging exposure of bank
portfolios to risky investment projects on economic growth should be of
serious concern because of the negative effects on capital formation,
innovation, and the process of adjustment in evolving industrial structure
in the economy.
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Definition of symbols:
II = overall expected return from portfolio.
a2 = variance of the overall expected return (measures
the riskiness of the portfolio).
IIi = expected return from the ith asset, where i = 1, 2,...,
= covariance of returns between ith and jth asset.
2
0T- = o"^ = variance of the ith asset, assumed > 0 since
all assets are assumed risky.
C= [°ii^ = the variance-covariance matrix of returns. In line
with the requirements of Islamic banking, it is assumed
here that no asset can be represented as a linear com-
bination of other assets. This assumption makes C
a nonsingular, symmetric and positive-defenite matrix.
C-1 = [dij] = the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix which is
also nonsingular, symmetric and positive-definite matrix.
\l, ^2 = Lagrange multipliers.
fi = the proportion of portfolio invested in the ith asset.
The problem is to find an efficient portfolio composed of N risk assets
subject to conditions that:
N N
(12) o2 = H fi f.
N
(13) n = I f± U± , and
i
N
(14) lf± - 1
i
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Forming the Lagrangian, we have:
(15)
First
(16)
(17)
(18)
N N
Min L = I I
i j
order conditions
N
i
n
l
fi fj aij +
yield:
fj aij " A
N
i
N
- X fi - o
i
N N
[R - I f± % ] + A2 [1 - X ft]
- X2 - 0 , i = 1, 2,..., N
, 1 = 1, 2,..., N
, 1 = 1 , 2,..., N
Because of the assumption regarding C, the fis which minimize a2 are
unique. The system (16) - (18) is linear in the fis. For the proportion
of the efficient portfolio invested in the kth asset from (16) we have:
N N
(19) fK - \x I dKj n j + x2 I
multiplying (19) by Hk and summing over K = 1, 2,..., N, yields:
N N N N N
(20) I fK = xx II dKi n-j + x2 I I dKj
i i i i i
N
X f
i
K R< =
NI
i
NI(21) I f  nK  xl I I d K j n. nK + x2 I XdKj n
  j i i
N N
J i^ TT
IC
i i
from (13), (14), (20) and (21) we obtain a linear system in A1 and A2 as:
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N N N N
(22) n = AX I I dKJ IL, nK + X2 H dKJ ILj
ii i i
N N N N
( 2 3 ) Xi T T d r i IIJ H,- + X? I I del = 1
i i J J i i J
From the assumption on C and its inverse, we have dkj = djk for all j and
< and also that:
N N N N
i i J J i i J
N N N N
Also £ £ dK1- JIJ and £ J d^ are quadratic forms of the inverse
i i J J i i J
matrix, therefore, they are strictly positive. Allowing
N N N N
I I dKJ ILj ; N = I I
N N
and P = I I dkj we can rewrite (22) and (23) as:
i i J
(22' ) n = Xj N + X2 M
(23') X2 N + X2 P = 1
solving (22' ) and (23' ) for a1 and X2 we have:
( 2 4 ) X 1 - P J H ,
(25) X
Q
N -
2
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where Q = NP - M2 and is positive because of the assumption that the inverse
matrix is positive-definite. Substitution of (24) and (25) in (19) gives
optimal f*k, the proportion of the efficient portfolio invested in the
kth asset as:
N N
(26) f*k = i
E I dKJ (PIlj-M) + I dKj(N - ILj)
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